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The BAROMETER is a student newspaper for the exchange of ideas and 
information concerning the development and improvement of the 
professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. 
************* 
"One of the legacies of the 1960 l s is government by crisis 
management, in which officials and legislators rush around 
putting out f i res that they themselves had a major role in 
igniting, quite often quarreling among themselves over who 0 
struck the match .... It would seem to be well past time ~6 ~ 
to move on to greater maturity, and stabil ity, in govern- "'T\ L. ::0 
ment. ... A pl an for a steady, orderly money supply growth, co ~ ~ 
orderly federal budget procedures that avoid excessive ~ ~ we 
stimulation through deficit spending, and a refusal to use ~ ~ ~ 
distortive gimmicks such as economic controls could go a 0 
long way towards returning the nation to economic stability. 
But as long as the emphasis of federal economic policy is 
on manipulation there will be crises and demands for crisis 
management. That may offer opportunity for brave talk from 
Washington but brave talk we can do without. What we need 
is a great deal less crisis, and with some changes of 
thinking in Washington that is an achievable goa1." 




EDITORIAL COMMENT: The view of the All-Volunteer Army from the military standpoint is 
presented in this second part of the two week feature, written by Lieutenant Colonel 
Harry G. Summers, Jr., who is assigned to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Military Operations, Washington, D. C. This article also appeared in the June 1972 
issue of the magazine, MILITARY REVIEW. 
FEATURE: AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY PART II 
"Another View of an All-Volunteer Army" 
Is the all-volunteer Army a good idea politically? To some the answer is a 
resounding no. The reasons given constitute an extension of the devil theory, so 
popular on many campuses today. This holds that the militaristic devils who dragged 
an innocent United States into the swamps of Vietnam will, upon their return from 
Southeast Asia, begin to work their wicked ways on the United States again. 
Other all-volunteer Army critics eschew such a simplistic view, but they, in turn, 
take almost as simplistic a view of the military. They operate from the unspoken 
assumption that the professional military is a monolith - that there is such a thing as 
a "military mind." 
As long ago as 1960, before the terrible divisions of the Vietnam War, the 
sociologist Morris Janowitz, in his in-depth study of the US military, The Professional 
Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, found that: 
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liThe military profession is not a monolithic power group. A deep split pervades 
its ranks in respect to its doctrines and viewpoints on foreign affairs, a split which 
mi rrors ci vi 1 ian di sagreements. II 
If anything, this tendency has increased in the last few years. 
It is no more true that all military officers are right-wing fanatics than it is 
true that all college professors are left-wing radicals. Many, no doubt, on both sides 
find such stereotypes comforting, but they do little to advance the cause of rational 
analysi s. 
What common threads, for example, run through such diverse personalities as General 
, . 
David Shoup and General Curtis LeMay? Where would Generals Maxwell Taylor and James ~ 
Gavin fit into the picture? Does such a stereotype explain General Omar Bradley, then 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, strongly endorsing President Truman IS limited 
war policies in Korea by stating publicly that General MacArthur's desire to expand the 
war to China was lithe wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time"? 
The critics could profit from a semester at the US Army Command and General Staff 
College to get back in touch with the real world, and the real military. They would 
find that the officer corps ranges the political spectrum from left to right, excluding 
the lunatic fringe at either end (although some embittered Leavenworth instructors would 
quarrel with that last caveat). 
The military is not recruited from Mars; it does not stand outside of American 
society. Military men learned the same truths from their parents, were exposed to the 
same childhood influences, attended the same primary schools and high schools (and, in 
most cases, the same colleges) as their contemporaries in the business and academic worlds. 
They are no less committed to American ideals than their civilian compatriots. Men 
are not as malleable as some apparently believe. Studies have shown that even the 
massive indoctrination campaigns of World War II did little to change men's allegiance 
and outlook on life. The beliefs inculcated by civilian society for 18 years are not 
likely to be radically changed by a tour in the Army. 
Much is made of the "alienation" within the military growing out of the Vietnam War. 
While one cannot deny that frustration does exist, a closer examination of this "aliena-
tion" would reveal that no single focus for frustration exists. Ward Just, in his 
excellent examination of today's Army, Military Men, found: 
"For the older men, the villains tend to be timorous civilians and the left-wing 
press; for the younger men, they are the tradition-bound senior generals and the craven 
press .•.. II 
If there is a "stab-in-the-back syndrome" - and I would not agree that there is -
it is certainly evident within the military that there is a complete lack of agreement 
over just who is holding the knife. 
Not only do Professors Kohn and Syrett do an injustice to the officer corps, they 
poor-mouth the enlisted ranks as well. They build a straw man of the pre-World War II 
Army, a straw man fashioned from the pages of James Jones I From Here to Eternity, that 
bears little resemblance to the facts. 
Given the depression of the 193Os, the manpower pool available to the Army was much 
more than the "scum of the earth enl isted for drink" that they make it out to be. These 
were the men, after all, who cadred the massive World War II buildup, who furnished a 
goodly number of the junior officers in thebeginnin9 of the war (including the first 
sergeant in From Here to Eternity, if memory serves), and who served as the leaven for 
the forces that fought World War II. Many of these men served full careers retiring 
as distinguished senior officers. 
'". 
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I fear that Kohn and Syrett are postulating the problems of the Vietnam War on the 
pre-World War II Army. Their comments apply not to the enlistees of the Vietnam War, 
but to the draftees. An analysis of just who was drafted for the Vietnam War would 
reveal that it was certainly not the sons of the rich, or the upper middle class. They 
IIbought" their way out with college deferments. As a young general in Vietnam 
sardonically told writer Arthur Hadley, liThe young men we are asking to go into action ... 
are not McNamara' s sons, or Bundy' s. I doubt they' re yours ... II 
It has been argued - by Bruno Bettleheim, for example - that much of the dissent 
against the war was occasioned by guilt feelings of the students who knew that the 
blacks, the poor and the dispossessed were serving in their stead in Vietnam; that they 
the students, who were the most favored of society in terms of wealth and position, 
were paying the least price to that society. They, therefore, had a moral imperative 
to find the war illegal, immoral and unjust and, therefore, not "worthy" of their service. 
Even without these problems, the draft traditionally has brought in relatively few 
soldiers from the upper ends of the social and economic spectrum, and vast numbers of 
the poor and the uneducated. This was true in World War II, as well as during the 
Korean Conflict. The Regular Army, on the other hand is concentrated more at the 
center of the socioeconomic spectrum. There is, after all, a simple solution to the 
problems of quality control. This simple solution, in use today, is to raise enlistment 
standards. Today, for example, mostly high school graduates enlist. High school 
dropouts with unsatisfactory records of behavior are not accepted. 
In addition to controlling the input to the Army through tightened enlistment 
standards, the Army has inbeing a set of internal controls. The Army's Qualitative 
Management Program includes time-in-service controls to deny re-enlistment to personnel 
not promoted or recommended for promotion at designated points of time ( a system long 
in effect for the officer corps - and even for the State Department's Foreign Service 
officers) and includes qualitative screening to identify personnel with the least 
potential for continued productive service. 
Tools to accomplish this include periodic enlisted efficiency reports and military 
occupational specialty qualification tests. While no one would claim that these controls 
are perfect, they do indicate that the Army is vitally aware of the problems of quality 
control. 
Clearing away some of the smoke and fury, it is well to look objectively at the 
Army. The officer corps, with the exception of medical and dental doctors, has always 
been an all-volunteer force. By the same token, the upper grades of the noncommissioned 
officer corps has also been all volunteer. At last reports, the Republic has withstood 
this "all-volunteer" force in good stead. 
The real question is raising enough lower grades by enlistment to fill the ranks of 
the Army. It is not anticipated t hat all of these men will be career men. Indeed, it 
is anticipated that the majority will not be career men. With a decent pay scale, with 
incentives to learn a trade or further their education, the Army cannot only meet its 
needs for well-qualified soldiers, but it can also provide a useful service to society 
by returning men better qualified for a place in the civilian job market. 
The real target of much criticism, it would appear, is not the all-volunteer Army, 
but the Army per se. As T. R. Fehrenbach found, and reported on, in his masterful study 
of the Korean War, This Kind of War: 
"There was and is no danger of military domination of the nation. The Constitution 
gave Congress the power of life and death over the military, and they have always 
accepted the fact. The danger has been the other way around - the liberal society, in 
its heart, wants not only the domination of the military, but acquiescence of the 
military toward the liberal view of life. Domination and control society should have .... 
But acquiescence society may not have, if it wants an army worth a damn. By the very 
nature of its mission, the military must maintain a hard and illiberal view of life and 
the world. Society's purpose is to live; the military is to stand ready, if need be, 
to die. II 
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Misconceptions about the nature of the Army are illustrated by fanciful scenarios 
for a military coup - "Communist" elements in the United States making an accommodation 
with the Soviets. To be anti-anticommunist, a very popular, almost de rigeur. stance 
in some parts of the intellectual community. one must, of necessity, posit an "anti-
communist" to react against. The popular figure is the caricature from "Dr. Strangelove," 
the .blustering, the mindless fanatic who sees a Communist behind every bush. 
At the risk of shattering illusions, such individuals are hardly the norm in today's 
military. It is interesting to note in this regard that President Nixon's advance party 
to Peking recently was led by Brigadier General Alexander Haig of the US Army. 
It is easy to dismiss these distortions; it is harder to deal with the dangers that 
underlie them - dangers of which military historians should be well aware. As Fehrenbach 
coomented: 
"Without its tough spearmen, Hell enic cul ture woul d have had nothi ng to gi ve the 
world. It would not have lasted long enough. When Greek culture became so sophisticated 
that its common men would no longer fight to the death, as at Thermopylae, but became 
clever and devious, a horde of Roman farm boys overran them. The time came when the 
descendants of the Macedonians ... went pale and sick at the sight of the havoc wrought 
by the Romanrgladius Hispanicuslas it carved its way toward Hellas." 
Aside from becoming pale and sick, what can be done to prevent such a fate overtaking 
the United States? Alexis de Tocqueville gave the answer in 1835 in his book Democracy 
in America: 
liThe remedy for the vi ces of the Army is not to be found in the Army i tse lf, but in 
the country. Democratic nations are naturally afraid of disturbances and of despotism; 
the object is to turn these natural instincts into intelligent, deliberate. and lasting 
tastes. When men have at last learned to make a peaceful and profitable use of freedom, 
and have felt its blessings - when they have conceived a manly love of order, and have 
freely submitted themselves to discipline - these same men. if they follow the profession 
of arms, bring into it, unconsciously and almost against their will, these same habits 
and manners. The general spirit of the nation being infused into the spirit peculiar 
to the Army, tempers the opinions and desires engendered by military life, or represses 
them by the mi ghty forces of pub 1 i c opi ni on. II Teach but the ci ti zens to be educated, 
orderly, firm, and free, and the soldiers will be disciplined and obedient. 
EDITORIAL 
The following Letter to the Editor was received this week from LT D. J. Marshall, USN 
concerning the controversial issue of flag rank promotion of returning POW's. Letters 
such as this should emphasize professional quality, closely reasoned argument, minimum 
verbiage and appropriate documentation. 
LETTER TO THE EDITOR 
The recent release of our prisoners of war was.anemotional and joyous experience for 
the country. I along with all but the most hardened cynics, rejoice in their freedom 
and wish them a complete recovery and a return to the normal life that they have been 
deprived of for so very long. 
This brief introduction is to set the record straight: I am not a cohort of 
Jane Fonda, stumbling mYopically from idiocy to absurdity in the name of peace. I have 
the greatest sympathy for these men and for their families. However, I have never 
thought that being a POW for seven years or so was, ~ se, indicative of qualification 
for advancement, especially to flag rank. --
I was therefore disappointed to see the names of Captains James Stockdale and 
Jeremiah Denton on the recent selection list for Rear Admiral. Granted that these men 
were, at one time, highly qualified officers (Capt. Stockdale was Commander of Air Group 
16 and Capt. Denton was Commander of Attack Squadron 5). What experience in the past 7 
years justifies their selection to Rear Admiral? Commanders when captured, promoted to 
Captain in captivity, they have demonstrated no operational or administrative expertise 
in the grade of Captain. One would think this a very necessary prerequisite for an 
Admiral of the unrestricted line. 
-
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The Secretary of the Navy in lIadvisingll the selection board said: IITheir loss 
of operational experience may well be outweighed by their gain in qualities of strengthened 
leadership.1I No doubt their trials and privations were extreme; obviously it tested them 
as no prior experience in their lives. But is that relevant? Does it automatically 
qualify them for Flag Rank? I think not, although few bleeding hearts will agree with 
me. An Admiral's job by its very nature is demanding and difficult. It is easy to bury 
an inefficient LCDR, CDR, or even CAPT at some of the more respectable graveyards such 
as CINCPAC or CINCPACFLT, where he has no possibility of contributing or effecting 
anything. Not so an Admiral, whose job is in the spotlight constantly. These are 
demanding billets (requiring considerable political astuteness if nothing else) and only 
those found properly qualified should be expected to fill them. 
For example, a Carrier Division Commander, almost without exception, is required 
to have completed a successful command of a carrier. Prior to this a qualifying command 
or another deep-draft command is absolutely essential. In addition, tours as a carrier XO, 
or Ops officer, or Chief of Staff for a Cardiv would have been highly desirable. Do seven 
years in prison, no matter how unpleasant, serve as an acceptable surrogate? 
It is my contention that the promotion of these men to flag rank is highly analagous 
to that of a young Lieutenant midway through a department head tour who, quite suddenly, 
leaves the Navy. For several years he pursues a completely unrelated avocation and is 
completely out of touch with the latest Naval developments, trends and techniques. 
During his absence he is promoted to LCDR. He then returns to the Navy, is promoted to 
CDR, and given command of a destroyer. Would you want to serve under him? 
D. J. MARSHALL 
LT, USN 
